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GREGORY FLYNN and 
HANS RATTINGER 
The motivation to produce this volume is both political and intellectual. 
During the past several years, debate has raged over the wisdom of 
NATO's decision in December 1979 to modernize its nuclear forces and 
simultaneously to negotiate with the Soviet Union in an effort to limit 
nuclear arms in Europe reciprocally. This debate has focused on two 
interrelated issues: first, the requirements for deterring aggression in an 
age of nuclear parity and second, the requirement to reassure Western 
populations that Western strategy is a lesser threat than Eastern strategy 
(compare Howard 1983). 
A viable security policy requires not only the capability to organize and 
to maintain the military prerequisites for deterrence and defense, but also 
a degree of societal acceptance of these measures. That current debates 
over security policy have assumed such proportions suggests how much 
the domestic context of security policy has changed in many Western 
countries. The current policy disputes in fact are about (1) exactly what 
has changed and (2) the dimensions of that change. 
People focus on how best to reconcile the requirement to reassure with 
the requirement to deter without at all being sure what the requirement 
for the former is (or the latter, for that matter). In the process, the public 
becomes the reason or the excuse for almost everything. Mutually exclu-
sive hypotheses about what has happened within Western publics over the 
past few years are easily developed, with selective use of overabundant 
data. Public opinion is being used to justify simultaneously demands for 
change and demands for continuity. The public is both a participant in 
and an object of current debates. Yet all affirmations about what "the 
public" believes contrast starkly with the lack of serious, systematic 
analysis of public opinion on national security issues. 
The purpose of this book is to contribute responsibly to the current 
political debate by providing a more adequate profile of the patterns of 
popular support and of popular discontent that Western governments 
must confront in security policy. lt seeks to do so first by sober assessment 
of popular attitudes in the security policy area from all available sources, 
not just selected sources. lt will also seek to clarify the conceptual, 
theoretical, and methodological problems that are posed for attempts at 
more accurate description and explanation. The reader will thus, it is 
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hoped, gain greater insight into what can, and perhaps more importantly, 
what cannot be said about public attitudes on defense and foreign policy 
and hence also into the political judgments that can (and cannot) be made 
about the public's role in current Western policy dilemmas. 
Recent contradictory assessments about what has been happening in 
Western publics have each assumed significant changes in public attitudes. 
One disputed issue concerns the extent to which these putative changes 
are permanent or transitory. Some, for example, argue that we are 
witnessing a long overdue "democratization" of defense policy, that 
popular participation in determining def ense priorities is natural and 
irreversible. The population at large is considered no longer willing to 
accept certain basic premises that have underlain Western defense efforts 
over the past thirty years. Accordingly, it is argued, governments must 
adjust both their policies and the way they make policy in order to take 
account of the new realities that are here to stay. 
Others argue public involvement in national security affairs is not 
permanently entrenched and that we are witnessing a period of public 
anxiety about the future unprecedented since the early postwar period, 
stemming as much from economic as other factors. Feeding this is a 
profound lack of public confidence in the ability of governments to resolve 
diffi.cult problems. In any case, security policy decisions are held to 
involve calculations that cannot always be adequately grasped by popula-
tions at !arge. The problem of recreating a viable consensus is, therefore, 
considered to be one of governments modifying their rhetoric to corres-
i)ond more closely to the realities as perceived by populations in order to 
help reinstill confidence. 
People differ just as widely over the second issue: whether this change 
should be regarded with sympathy or concern. Those who apocalyptically 
subscribe to the notion that societal acceptance of a viable Western 
deterrent is diminishing draw the conclusion that internal social evolu-
tions in the Western democracies are eroding the capability of these 
nations to survive in freedom and security. On the other hand, others 
rejoice that now, finally, popular unrest and pressure could force govern-
ments to abandon their trodden paths of national security policy, to 
abandon the inhumane dependence on nuclear deterrence, to initiate 
unilateral arms reduction, or to search for entirely new security arrange-
ments that would no longer rely on the threat or the application of military 
force. 
The very nature of these arguments points to the urgent need for a 
careful analysis of the "new realities" surrounding national security policy 
in Western nations. lt is in fact surprising that better, more responsible 
use has not been made of the wealth of public opinion data available. 
Analysis of the criteria and intensity with which publics evaluate the 
threats to Western security, on the one hand, and how governments 
provide for security, on the other, is simply inadequate. Yet this is a 
precondition for determining how deterrence and reassurance can best be 
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reconciled with one another, and therefore how best to resolve the public 
policy problem currently the source of this tremendous political dispute. 
This book obviously addresses a complex network of interrelated 
problems. At the same time its scope is inevitably limited at the opera-
tional level. We want to look here at what is going on in the publics of 
Western nations with respect to their perceptions and attitudes on national 
security. The only raw material we have is public opinion data. Moreover, 
these data are one of the vehicles of current political strife, if not products 
of it. This must be borne in mind throughout the remainder of this book. 
We can strive hard to deliver nothing but scholarly investigation and 
interpretation, but we have to be aware that our most important material 
is also used for quite different purposes, including manipulation and 
propaganda. 
A simple example may serve to illustrate the need for a more serious and 
detached perspective toward these data. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in Mannheim has in recent 
months regularly asked respondents in its monthly surveys how they felt 
about deploying new nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic vs. contin-
uing negotiations in Geneva. In May and June of 1983, the percentages of 
respondents rejecting new nuclear missiles were almost identical; in July 
this figure was slightly higher, but within limits explicable by sampling 
fl.uctuations. 
The May and June figures were reported by the second German 
television network (for whom these surveys were taken), but the slightly 
higher July figure was not reported on the premise that it was not really 
news. The July figure became known to the German peace movement, 
who then held a press conference, expounding on the rise of rejection of 
new nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic and denouncing the second 
TV network for "suppressing" this information. As a consequence, the 
July figure (which conveyed no other political message than published 
data from previous months) was assigned even greater importance by the 
peace movement. lt was televised and broadcast widely both inside and 
outside Germany, and all those who thought they had anything to gain 
spread the news that something dramatic and quite unprecedented had 
happened within West German public opinion on the issue of missile 
deployment. This example clearly demonstrates that a considerable clarifi-
cation of our knowledge and analytical tools is necessary. 
Our ability to convey to decision makers a clearer notion of the context 
and constraints within which they have to operate is limited by two 
considerations. First, this volume almost exclusively deals with mass 
attitudes. The formation of opinion within groups of "opinion leaders"; 
their organization and activities, their interaction with political parties, 
social groups, the media, and with mass opinion will not be investigated 
systematically. For decision makers the knowledge that their policies are 
supported by a "silent majority" off ers little consolation if resistance of 
minorities is based upon intensely held attitudes, weil organized and 
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publicized, and echoed by key social groups, political parties, and the 
media. Consensus on a particular national security policy has much to do 
with mass attitudes, but it is not an exclusively quantitative concept. 
Second, the intellectual side of our problem prevents us from giving 
definitive answers to what mass attitudes on defense currently really look 
like, at least beyond a certain level of generality. We frequently encounter 
more problems than answers, and upon close scrutiny apparently certain 
and stable results of mass opinion on national security and defense can 
dissolve into speculatioll and guesswork. Mass opinions on national 
security and defense in many ways prove to be extremely diffuse and 
intangible. 
The media today carry regularly the most recent survey data on nuclear 
weapons, arms control negotiations, and the Atlantic Alliance. However, 
this abundance of current data is an additional part of the problem we face, 
as it stands in stark contrast to the lack of earlier data. In the sixties and 
seventies national security was largely uncontroversial; there was little 
public interest and involvement. Therefore, there was little incentive to 
include appropriate questions in opinion surveys. In many cases we simply 
do not know whether the mass attitudes reported now are any different 
from those of earlier years. Some of the attitudes or contradictions in 
attitudes that we find and that worry or delight us today may actually not 
be new at all, but in earlier times we did not know about these attitudes, 
and we did not want to know about them for lack of political relevance. 
For the same set of reasons there also has been little serious social-
psychological and political science research on the origins, formation, 
structure, and dynamics of defense-related mass opinion. One could even 
go further and say that there is rather little research on foreign-policy-
related mass attitudes in general, as the accepted notion has long been that 
foreign affairs and international relations are issue areas that are very 
remote for the average citzen (Rosenau 1961, 35; Hughes 1978, 23). For 
all practical purposes, the "public" attentive to and knowledgeable on 
foreign affairs for many years has been conceived of as a rather limited 
"elite public." 
Many of those actively involved in the current political debates sur-
rounding defense policy believe that this has changed dramatically. Yet it 
remains probable that sizeable segments of populations still have rather 
little interest in and information about this issue area and rate it rather low 
in personal importance. Under these conditions, reactive measurement as 
applied in public opinion polls can lead to very undesirable results. 
Current polls investigate surprisingly detailed aspects of national security 
attitudes. lt is entirely conceivable that sizeable shares of samples are 
required to indicate perceptions or evaluations of matters on which they 
have almost no information at all, and about which they have never before 
been required to form an opinion or even think. Of course, they could 
refuse to reply or say that they "don't know." But perhaps they choose not 
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to do this, in order, for example, not to appear ignorant or to please the 
interviewer. 
Applying reactive measurement in such situations invariably provokes a 
certain number of "non-attitudes" (Converse 1970). Respoi;idents may 
choose randomly from the alternatives they are being offered, they may 
reply on the basis of what they think is socially desirable or acceptable, 
responses may reflect attitude dimensions that are very different from the 
ones that are to be ascertained (and that are evoked by the particular 
question format used), and there can be sizeable effects of survey tech-
niques. One could almost say that, with issue areas in which respondents 
know and care little, the person who designs the questions to a considera-
ble extent determines the outcome of the poll. This is, of course, what 
makes this field so accessible to skillful manipulation. 
lt must be emphasized at this point that this embodies absolutely no 
value judgment about the public itself. The judgment being made con-
cerns our methodological limitations in understanding public opinion on 
national security issues. In the chapters that follow there will be many 
instances in which the authors attempt to determine the extent to which 
the data they have gathered includes such nonattitudes. This is in no way 
meant to imply that "attitudes" should exist. Highly structured opinions, 
especially in response to detailed questions, will only exist on issues close 
enough to individual experience or interest, and national security policy 
falls into this category for only a limited number of people. 
In order to get a complete and reliable grasp on the mainstream of 
public opinion on national security in various Western countries, we 
would really need to be able to draw on an established body of knowledge 
about how foreign policy attitudes in general and national security atti-
tudes in particular are formed, how stable they are, to what influences 
they respond, what their basic dimensions are, and so on. This kind of 
research, at least any comprehensive work, is simply not available and it is 
certainly too much, in one volume, to develop and empirically test such a 
theory and to present an inventory of available findings, as is the purpose 
of this volume. 
Such a theory probably would have to start from a classification of the 
substance that national security attitudes comprise, such as overall goals, 
derived instruments and strategies; facts (past, present, and future), and 
actors. Attitudes in these substantively delineated fields then would have 
to be differentiated further according to the familiar distinction of cogni-
tive vs. affective vs. behavioral components (Rosenberg and Hovland 
1960), and the relationship of the "salience" (Hartley and Hartley 1952) or 
"personal importance" dimension with these other three components 
would have to be clarified. Starting from this kind of conceptual inventory 
of the issue area to be investigated ultimately should lead to more precise 
notions than we have now of what aspects of national security mass 
opinions can be surveyed with what instruments with a reasonable degree 
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of validity; what aspects are most susceptible to instrument effects; what 
components are most likely colored by what other attitude dimensions; 
and so forth. Such extensive theoretical and conceptual clarification of the 
mental structures we are dealing with here could ultimately lead to a series 
of empirically testable propositions which currently are not yet available. 
Perhaps a small example would serve to clarify this. Imagine a survey 
question asking under what conditions different countries would be most 
likely to start a "nuclear" war (a question aiming at perceptions of 
hypothetical futures). lt is entirely conceivable that this expectation of 
circumstances is almost completely determined by stereotypes and evalua-
tions of foreign countries. What we would like to know is people's 
expectations about future possibilities for nuclear war, but what we 
actually may be measuring is what nations they like and dislike. Cogni-
tions may be structured by affectively determined attitudes. In the field of 
mass foreign policy and national security attitudes, problems like this have 
almost never been seriously dealt with in the professional literature, all 
abundance of timely polling data notwithstanding. 
The chapters on public opinion on national security that follow in this 
volume all attempt as seriously as possible to go beyond simple description 
of the available data to characterize important developments in the 
individual nations. We try hard to ascertain not only what the relevant 
data look like, but also what can and cannot be concluded from them. We 
try hard not to take the data at face value, but to produce some meaningful 
interpretations of the dimensions of attitudes that may be underneath the 
surface of the multitude of individual findings that are being presented. 
But, as should be obvious from the above, there are severe limits to the 
extent to which this book can perform a coherent and comparative critical 
evaluation of the available data base. Because the general theoretical and 
methodological inventory required to perform such a task in the field of 
mass attitudes related to national security is not yet available, the range of 
conclusions that can be drawn from the data presented in the subsequent 
chapters sometimes is very wide. Quite certainly, there are segments of 
public opinion on national security in which the interpretations of the 
authors represented in this volume diff er widely, some deciding that their 
data measure what they are supposed to measure and that meaningful 
political conclusions can be drawn, although others would maintain that 
we cannot really be sure what the same set of data is measuring. This 
implies, of course, that there are aspects of the whole problem about 
which we and the authors on the individual countries would agree that 
prescriptions for policy should not be made at all, or only with the utmost 
care in view of the low confidence we can put in one particular interpreta-
tion of one particular set of data. 
This volume comprises contributions from several different countries: 
first, the United States; second, Britain, Germany, Italy, and the Nether-
lands as Western European partners to the Atlantic Alliance that have 
been designated for the deployment of new American Intermediate Range 
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Nuclear Forces (INF); third, France as another major European member 
of NATO, but with a special position not only in terms of its membership 
in the Alliance but also in terms of its attitude toward INF deployment 
and of the absence of the antinuclear protest pervading all the other 
Western European countries that are treated in this volume; and finally, 
Norway as one of the smaller countries within the Alliance that borders on 
the Soviet Union but is not scheduled to receive INF. Even though this is 
probably a relevant sample of the member nations of NATO for the 
purpose of this book, its final composition, of course, also has something 
to do with the availability of authors who were capable and willing to 
prepare extensive and original contributions. 
The differences among the seven nations investigated in the chapters 
that follow make the task of producing a truly comparative volume very 
difficult indeed. An attempt was made to assure a certain minimum of 
comparability by asking all authors to structure their contributions around 
four specific themes that clearly overlap, but with each representing one 
core element in public perceptions of Western security and security 
requirements. These four major analytical axes and the basic justification 
of each are as follows: 
1. Images of the Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union is constantly referred to as a threat, but we have a 
limited understanding of the different concepts that exist of the 
Soviet Union in the populations of the nations of the Alliance. Such 
an understanding requires further exploration of the different bases 
for evaluating the Soviet adversary, especially the relationship of 
military, economic, and political factors. Do we continue to have two 
profoundly different views of the Soviet Union existing side by side 
in the West? To what extent are attitudes toward Western defense 
policies a function of specific perceptions of the Soviet Union? 
2. Images of security 
The traditional boundaries between concepts of security, i.e. na-
tional, personal, economic, and so on, seem to have eroded. The 
problems of security as perceived by populations at large seem to be 
as much internal as external, as much economic as military. What in 
fact are populations most concerned about? Is military power, for 
instance, seen primarily to be a source of insecurity rather than 
security? To what extent, especially during prolonged periods of 
economic constraint, does defense policy risk becoming the prisoner 
of more immediate security concerns as perceived by populations? 
3. Images of deterrence 
The growth of organized protest against nuclear weapons makes it 
imperative that popular perceptions of Western strategy be better 
analyzed. To what extent is the way the West provides itself with 
security truly considered more threatening than the Eastern bloc? 
What is the true extent of nuclear protest, and to what extent is it a 
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symbol or surrogate for other frustrations and f ears? ls a shift toward 
greater reliance on conventional forces likely to diminish the 
strength of protest or simply to alter its focus? 
4. Images of allies 
Currently, on both sides of the Atlantic, allies are frequently consid-
ered more a liability than an asset. There is a curious popular 
unwillingness to listen and to give credence to security problems as 
perceived by one's allies. The extent and the wellsprings of this 
mutual rejectionism need considerable exploration. ls it, for exam-
ple, more the role of the United States than nuclear weapons as such 
that is at the roots of current European protest? Does popular 
opinion in the United States really reßect the often mentioned 
growing frustration with European positions on foreign policy is-
sues? How much support do alternative arrangements to provide for 
security command? 
By surrendering to these four general themes we have been able to 
concentrate each country "profile" on describing and artalyzing related 
sets of attitudes, even though there are obvious constraints to the compar-
ative approach. The problems of this present world affect our seven 
countries in quite different ways. Historically and culturally there is wide 
variance between them. Because of particular national contexts and 
experiences problems that are being surveyed in one country in a pat'ticu-
lar fashion are polled from a quite different angle in another nation. 
Therefore, even though a great deal of the substance' that is being 
investigated in opinion polls in these seven countries is identical, question 
wording and the specific stimuli with which respondents are presented 
vary widely, so that the resulting data are not directly comparable in any 
strict sense. There also are big differences between the nations in the 
extent to which comparable data from earlier years or even complete time 
series ranging over ten, twenty, or thirty years could be found. Public 
opinion polls do not, of course, have the same traditions in all these 
nations. Finally, because of the prominent role of governments and official 
agencies in commissioning public opinion polls on measures of national 
security and defense, the accessibility of data is not the same in all 
countries. Some publish freely or at least supply almost all material to 
researchers upon request. Others pursue more restrictive policies. In spite 
of their common structure, the subsequent chapters thus exhibit consider-
able variance in terms of substance, and of style and extent of their 
treatment of particular aspects of our overall problem. 
This introduction should bave made the reader aware that the authors of 
this book have confronted a difficult task. In view of the complexity of the 
problems and of the scarcity of available theoretical or comparative 
empirical research the reader should be warned against expecting too 
much from this one volume. Its contributions set out to describe what 
mass public opinion on national security matters looks like in some 
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important member nations of the Atlantic Alliance and how this has 
developed over the past several years. In that sense, the volume should 
also serve as an easily accessible cross-national data base, as a kind of 
"handbook" of defense-related public opinion in these seven countries. In 
addition, there will be some preliminary critical evaluation of what can 
and what cannot be concluded from these data. 
Those seeking proof of dramatic shifts in popular attitudes on security 
policy, shifts that undermine the premises on which Western policies have 
been based, will not find it in the chapters that follow. Likewise, those 
who would believe that nothing of any significance has happened and that 
we can carry on "business as usual" will not find much comfort in this 
book. The reality, to the extent the research presented here has been able 
to bring it into sharper relief, lies somewhere in between. 
This is not a study of elites, of opinion leaders, of peace movements. 
This is not a study of mass-elite, elitemedia, and other interactions that 
shape the process of political communication and the formation of political 
will. lt is not a study of ongoing political battles in these countries, 
attempting to forecast possible outcomes or possible changes in policy. lt 
is an inventory of mass opinions on national security in the nations of the 
Atlantic Alliance, something until now unavailable despite all of the 
regular assertions on what the public thinks. Under these circumstances, 
even a study with such limited aspirations should prove valuable in our 
current political debates over how best to provide for peace and security. 
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